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Mexico is estimated to have 9.8 billion barrels of untapped oil 
reserves, or about 10 percent of the world’s crude oil; however, 
much remains undeveloped and production is declining as a result 
of dysfunction in the structure of Mexico’s petroleum regime. Until 
recently, Mexico’s Constitution and laws limited oil and gas 
activities to those of its state oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex), which struggled to invest in new drilling and technology. 
In 2013, however, Mexico reopened its petroleum sector to foreign 
investment. Although 75 years in the making, Mexico is taking a 
bold new path toward developing its petroleum resources. Mexico 
stands to benefit from foreign investment and new technology to 
develop its remaining resources, which include shale deposits, 
deepwater reserves, and reserves only recoverable through 
modern enhanced recovery techniques. 
 
This two-part article has two objectives: Part I reviews the history 
of petroleum in Mexico—much of it unhappy—as a reminder of the 
long and tortuous pathway that led to Mexico’s current initiative 
to open its petroleum sector to foreign investment. The Mexican 
economy was built on oil in the early 1900s, but a combination of 
nationalism, petroleum-investor arrogance, and eventual over-
dependence on petroleum revenues all served to undermine the 
Mexican oil industry. It is important for petroleum investors to 
understand and appreciate this history in order to ease the 
transition of new oil production in Mexico. At the same time, the 
people of Mexico should take a long-term, forward-looking view 
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of Mexico’s oil and gas future, which should be bright. 
 
Part II, published in another journal, discusses the current reform 
of Mexico’s petroleum laws, including its initiative to resume 
direct foreign investment in the upstream petroleum sector.§ 
§ 20.01 INTRODUCTION 




Mexico has an estimated 9.8 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves,2 and 
its total petroleum resources, including shale oil and shale gas, may be second only 
in size and scope to the resources in the Arctic.3 Nevertheless, much of this oil 
remains undeveloped owing to the dysfunctional structure of Mexico’s petroleum 
regime. Until recently, Mexico’s Constitution and laws have restricted the conduct 
of oil and gas activities to the state oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex). 
Pemex has had a great deal of success in exploring and developing Mexico’s 
petroleum resources, with oil production peaking at about 3.4 million barrels per day 
in 2004.4 Nevertheless, within the last decade, oil production has steadily declined.5 
Despite Mexico’s similar geology to that of its NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) partners, production in the United States and Canada, until the recent oil 
price collapse, has steadily increased since 2008, while Mexico’s oil production has 
steadily decreased.6 To satisfy projected natural gas demand, Mexico must import 
gas equal to its domestic production by 2027.7 This disparity in oil and gas 
production is due to the development of new oil and gas recovery technology widely 
used in the United States and Canada that Mexico has been unable to access as a 
consequence of a long, sordid relationship with foreign oil companies. In order to 
 
        § Owen L. Anderson & J. Jay Park, South of the Border, Down Mexico Way: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Petroleum Development in Mexico—Part II, 61 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20–21, 20–22, 20–
33 to 20–34 (2015). 
 1. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 14 (1st ed. 1991). 
 2. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. [EIA], U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MEXICO: INT’L ENERGY DATA AND 
ANALYSIS 1 (2015), https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Mexico/
mexico.pdf. 
 3. Adam Critchley, Mexico’s oil, gas reserves could be second only to Arctic reserves – EY, 
BUSINESS NEWS AMERICAS (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/oilandgas/mexicos-oil-
gas-reserves-could-be-second-only-to-arctic-ey/. 
 4. Jon Bosak, Keys to Understanding the Petroleum Situation, IBIBLIO, http://ibiblio.org/tcrp/
sidebars/extraction.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2010); Mexico Crude Oil Production by Year, INDEX 
MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=mx&product=oil&graph=production (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
 5. EIA, supra note 2. 
 6. Andy Bergmann et al., World’s Top Oil Producers, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/
interactive/news/economy/worlds-biggest-oil-producers/ (last updated Feb. 11, 2016) (interactive map 
showing U.S. and Canada increases and Mexico decreases). 
 7. Mike Ford, Mexico’s Energy Ministry Projects Rapid Near-Term Growth of Natural Gas Imports 
from U.S., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (May 29, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/today
inenergy/detail.cfm?id=16471. 
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overcome stagnant development and to become more independent from foreign 
hydrocarbons imports, Mexico has reconsidered its long and embattled relationship 
with foreign oil investment. 
In 1938, the Mexican government expropriated the petroleum assets of 
foreign oil investors and established a new state-owned oil company, Petróleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex), to carry out exploration and production activities. Pemex’s 
successes enabled the Mexican government to rely on oil and gas revenues as the 
country’s single largest revenue source, at the cost of depriving Pemex of revenues 
needed to find new petroleum reserves in order to sustain itself.8 Much of the capital 
Pemex secured for future development has been borrowed, further burdening the 
company with a substantial debt.9 Pemex also struggled to modernize effectively 
because internal dysfunction, together with legal barriers, discouraged partnerships 
with private companies that had access to investment capital, modern technology, 
and the expertise needed to develop deep-water10 and unconventional11 petroleum 
resources. Pemex’s inability to invest sufficient funds in promising deep-water areas 
in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, has robbed it of a promising opportunity to 
generate substantial new revenues. 
After a decade of minor oil reforms, Mexico began major reforms to its 
petroleum regime in 2013, including amendments to its Constitution.12 Recognizing 
that Mexico’s inability to make use of its petroleum reserves lay not within Pemex 
but in the structure of the state’s petroleum regime, the Mexican government began 
a comprehensive revision of its energy policy. Between 2013 and 2015, Mexico 
amended the energy provisions in its Constitution, enacted related legislation and 
regulations, and developed new petroleum investment contract models.13 Following 
 
 8. Paul A. Sánchez Campos, Whatever happened to the Mexican Oil Bonanza? The Challenges of 
Mexico’s New Oil Fund, 56.2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291 (2016); see also Adam Williams, Pemex Sees Total 
Debt Rising Above $100 Billion Next Year, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-12-02/pemex-sees-total-debt-rising-above-100-billion-next-year. 
 9. Anthony Harrup, Moody’s Downgrades Mexican Oil Company Pemex, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 
24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-downgrades-mexican-oil-company-pemex-1448424567. 
 10. Deep water generally refers to “[e]xploration activity located in offshore areas where water 
depths exceed approximately 600 feet [200 m], the approximate water depth at the edge of the continental 
shelf. While deep-water reservoir targets are geologically similar to reservoirs drilled both in shallower 
present-day water depths as well as onshore, the logistics of producing hydrocarbons from reservoirs 
located below such water depths presents a considerable technical challenge.” Definition of “Deepwater 
Play,” SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY, http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms/d/
deepwater_play.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (definition). 
 11. “At present, the term unconventional resources is used in reference to oil and gas resources whose 
porosity, permeability, fluid trapping mechanism, or other characteristics differ from conventional 
sandstone and carbonate reservoirs.” Definition of “Unconventional Resource,” SCHLUMBERGER 
OILFIELD GLOSSARY, http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/u/unconventional_resource.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016). The term is also used to refer to any high-cost exploration and development 
operations that require modern and expensive technology, such as Arctic, deepwater, and ultra-deepwater 
drilling. See, e.g., Unconventional Oil and Gas Series: Deepwater and Arctic Drilling Webinar, 
http://www.sustainalytics.com/unconventional-oil-and-gas-series-deepwater-and-arctic-drilling-webinar 
(last visited May 26, 2016). 
 12. See generally CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43313, MEXICO’S OIL 
AND GAS SECTOR: BACKGROUND, REFORM EFFORTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 4 
(Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43313.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 4–5. 
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the earlier lead of other Latin American states, such as Brazil in 199714 and Colombia 
in 2003,15 that have successfully changed their petroleum regimes, Mexico now 
invites private investment to explore onshore and offshore areas. In 2015, the first 
new contracts were awarded under the new regime.16 The new petroleum regime has 
restructured Pemex into a state-owned productive enterprise that will compete for 
oil and gas prospects in Mexico while retaining its existing oil and gas producing 
resources and most of its undeveloped discoveries.17 In addition, the Reform 
modernizes Mexico’s administrative and regulatory bodies and intends to improve 
transparency and accountability, secure sustainable (durable) development of its 
petroleum resources, and maximize government take.18 
This article has two objectives: First, it reviews the history of petroleum in 
Mexico—much of it unhappy—as a reminder of the long and tortuous pathway that 
led to Mexico’s current initiative to open its petroleum sector to foreign investment.19 
While we hope that the people of Mexico will take a long-term view of the future, 
and not dwell on this history, petroleum investors should understand and remember 
it. If properly implemented, the new Mexican energy policies and reforms offer a 
bright and beneficial future for Mexico. 
Second, Part II of this article discusses Mexico’s current reform of its 
petroleum laws, efforts to revitalize Pemex into a modern petroleum company, and 
initiatives to resume direct foreign investment in the upstream petroleum sector. The 
parallel reforms in Mexico’s electricity sector are beyond the scope of this article. 
Part II was previously published in another journal.20 
The Mexican economy was built on oil in the early 1900s, but nationalism, 
petroleum-investor arrogance, and the national government’s over-dependence on 
petroleum revenues combined to fetter replacing reserves and undermine the 
 
 14. See generally Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, The New Oil and Gas Industry in Brazil: An 
Overview of the Main Legal Aspects, 36 TEX. INT’L L. J. 141 (2001). 
 15. See generally Claro Manuel Cotes Ricciulli, Colombian Petroleum Policy: Oil and Gas Policy 
and Its Regulatory Entities Before and After 2003—Ecopetrol and the Creation of the National 
Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) in Colombia. 
 16. Owen L. Anderson & J. Jay Park, South of the Border, Down Mexico Way: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Petroleum Development in Mexico—Part II, 61 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20–21, 20–22, 
20–33 to 20–34 (2015). 
 17. See generally Francisco Rivero, Pemex’s Makeover: What You Need to Know About Pemex’s 
Changing Corporate Structure, Oil and Gas Monitor (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.oilgasmonitor.com/pem
exs-makeover-what-you-need-to-know-about-pemexs-changing-corporate-structure/ (last visited May 
26, 2016). 
 18. For an overview of the full package of energy reforms, including electricity, see generally Adrian 
Lajous, Mexican Energy Reform, CNTR. ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY, Columbia Univ. (June 2014), 
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/CGEP_Adrian%20Lajous_Mexican%20Ener
gy%20Reform_Final.pdf (last visited May 26, 2016). 
 19. See generally YERGIN, supra note 1; see LORENZO MEYER, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE OIL CONTROVERSY, 1917–1942, at 6–19 (Muriel Vasconcellos trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 1977); 
DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011); 
Walter D. Hawk, Legal Features of the Oil Question Involved in Mexican-American Diplomacy, 22 ILL. 
L. REV. 150 (1927). For an excellent historical summary, including a timeline of Mexican energy policy 
to the year 2000, see Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 
TEX. INT’L LAW J. 75 (2001). 
 20. Anderson & Park, supra note 16. 
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Mexican economy. After seventy-five years in the making, Mexico is taking a bold 
new path toward developing its petroleum resources. Questions remain as to whether 
the new petroleum regime will lead to the anticipated investment and increased 
petroleum production, revenues, and reserves. The answers will come over time, as 
new contracts are awarded and new exploration and development activities begin. 
Unfortunately for Mexico, the reforms coincidentally occurred at a time of low oil 
and gas prices, which has required Mexico to reduce its fiscal terms to encourage 
investors to participate in Mexican bid rounds. 
§ 20.02 EARLY MEXICO MINERAL LAW HISTORY 




Mineral exploration in Mexico began with Spanish conquests in the 
sixteenth century. In 1519, Hernán Cortés began his conquest of central Mexico with 
an army of 500 men.22 Although he did so in the name of Charles I of Spain (Charles 
V of the Holy Roman Empire), Cortés and his army were primarily interested in 
personal gain, and Cortés financed his venture with what remained of his own 
wealth.23 By 1521, Cortés conquered central Mexico and the Aztec civilization, and 
in 1535, Charles I established a colonial government.24 In 1556, Charles I abdicated 
in favor of his son, Phillip II,25 who began a period of Spanish mineral exploration. 
Although Castile26 decrees relating to minerals were made as early as the 1380s,27 it 
was not until 1584 that Phillip II issued the first Spanish decree authorizing a mining 
ordinance.28 The decree repealed all prior conflicting decrees and also granted 
people, including foreigners, the right to prospect and mine certain minerals upon 
registration of claims and payment of royalty to the crown.29 Phillip II’s successor, 
Carlos III, followed by issuing the first mining decree specific to Mexico, the 
 
 21. 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA [hereinafter Bethel], 180 (Leslie Bethel ed., 
1984). 
 22. Id. 
 23. PHILIP L. RUSSELL, THE HISTORY OF MEXICO: FROM PRE-CONQUEST TO PRESENT [hereinafter 
RUSSELL], 116 (1st ed., 2010). 
 24. Bethel, supra note 21, at 205. 
 25. Id. at 287. 
 26. Castile was a medieval kingdom located on the Iberian Peninsula. It was one of several kingdoms 
that formed Spain. Bethel, supra note 21, at 158. 
 27. John C. Lacey, The Mining Ordinances of New Spain: A Study of Colonial Administration of the 
Mining Industry, 10 BULL. OF THE PEAK DISTRICT MINES HIST. SOC’Y 236, 236 (1988), 
http://www.pdmhs.com/docs/default-source/bulletins/bulletin-10-4/bulletin-10-4---the-mining-ordinance
s-of-new-spain---a-stud.pdf; FRANCIS XAVIER DE GAMBOA, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE MINING 
ORDINANCES OF SPAIN 17–18 (Richard Heathfield trans., 1830) (noting a mineral grant as early as 1297). 
 28. GAMBOA, supra note 27, at 5, 18–20. 
 29. A COLLECTION OF MINING LAWS OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 70, 75 [hereinafter HALLECK] (H. W. 
Halleck ed. & trans., 1859) (quoting the 1584 decree of Phillip II). Between 1780 and 1793, various 
decrees were issued concerning the royalty-free mining of coal, but these laws were applicable only in 
Spain, not Mexico. MERRILL RIPPY, OIL AND MEXICAN REVOLUTION 7–9 [hereinafter RIPPY] (1972); 
LACEY, supra note 27, at 239. 
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Ordenanzas de Aranjuez, in 1783.30 The 1783 decree declared mines, whether on 
public or private land, to be the property of the crown—subject to the people’s right 
to prospect and mine upon payment of royalty to the crown31 and specifically 
mentioned bitumen, mineral tars, and “jugos de la tierra” (juices of the earth).32 
Although the 1783 decree did not expressly mention petroleum, most jurists would 
have likely concluded that the law included petroleum.33 
 
It’s time for our emancipation; this is the hour of our freedom, and 
if you know its great value, you will help me defend it against the 
claw of ambitious tyrants. 
 
-Don Miguel Hidalgo y Castillo (1810)34 
 
Much of the substance of earlier royal Spanish mineral decrees remained 
intact even after Mexico’s independence. On September 16, 1810, the eleven-year 
struggle for Mexico’s independence from Spain began with a cry for revolution by 
Creole Catholic priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla.35 The Creoles (Spaniards born in 
the new world) resented royal administration, the expulsion of the Jesuits, the ending 
of their participation in the colonial government when Spaniards were sent from 
Spain to run colonial offices and commercial enterprises, increased taxes, various 
economic restrictions, the burden providing and funding compulsory local military 
forces, lower living standards despite economic growth, trade restrictions, and a debt 
consolidation decree.36 They were also alarmed by French and U.S. liberalism and 
by France’s influence over Spain.37 The Creoles were eventually successful in 
ousting Spanish officials.38 Mexico gained independence from Spain in 182139—the 
same year in which Stephen F. Austin was allowed to colonize Tejas (Texas).40 
Mexico became an official republic in 1824.41 
Under the Treaty of Córdoba of August 24, 1821, Spanish civil laws—
including the mineral ordinance of 1783—generally remained the law of Mexico, 
 
 30. HALLECK, supra note 29, at 222–23 (quoting Royal Ordinances, May 22, 1783). 
 31. Id. 
 32. HALLECK, supra note 29, at 230 (quoting Royal Ordinances, May 22, 1783). 
 33. See RIPPY, supra note 29, at 1–7. 
 34. Loose translation of El Grito de Dolores (The Cry of Dolores), announcing the start of the 
Mexican War of Independence. Don Miguel Gregorio Antonio Ignacio Hidalgo-Costilla y Gallaga 
Mandarte Villaseñor (more commonly known as Don Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla), September 16, 1810 
(now celebrated as Mexican Independence Day). Mexican Independence, SONS OF DEWITT COLONY 
TEXAS, http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/mexicanrev.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 35. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 117. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Austin’s Colony, SONS OF DEWITT COLONY TEXAS, http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/
adp/history/hispanic_period/tenoxtitlan/austins_colony.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 41. See Mexican Constitution of 1824, SONS OF DEWITT COLONY TEXAS, http://www.tamu.
edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/constit1824.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
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despite independence from Spain.42 It was not until 1836 that Spain’s claim to 
Mexico’s mineral wealth was finally vested in the Mexican government by the 
Treaty of Peace and Amity.43 Because Mexico had a federal system, it was unclear 
whether the states of Mexico or the federal government exercised control of lands, 
waters, and minerals. In 1857, the Constitution settled the issue, granting control to 
the federal government.44 In 1884, Mexico’s Congress passed a landmark law 
granting subsoil rights in certain minerals to overlying landowners.45 To understand 
the 1884 law, it is critical to understand U.S.-Mexico relations in the 1800s. 
§ 20.03. U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
The American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered 
as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. 
 
-James Monroe (1823)46 
 
The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the 
continent . . . 
 
-William Gilpin (1846)47 
 




By the mid-1800s, the Monroe Doctrine had been transformed from a 
warning to European powers to cease colonial expansion into a manifesto of U.S. 
dominance over the Western Hemisphere. This period was not a time of friendly 
U.S.-Mexico relations. 
In 1836, Texas settlers and immigrants—mostly from the U.S.—defeated 
Dictator-General Antonio López de Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto, 
enshrining their own independence through the signing of the Treaties of Velasco.49 
Despite subsequent Mexican leaders’ refusal to recognize these treaties (as they were 
 
 42. Treaty of Córdoba, Mex.-Spain, art. 12, 24 de agosto de 1821 (Aug. 24, 1821), http://www.
juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/conshist/pdf/tratcord.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 43. ANTONIO J. BERMÚDEZ, THE MEXICAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1–2 (1963). Although 
of questionable validity, state control over minerals was reaffirmed by decree of Emperor Maximilian in 
1865. Id. at 2. See also RIPPY, supra note 29, at 11. 
 44. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 48. 
 45. Código de Minas de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mining Code of the United Mexican States) 
[hereinafter “Código de Minas”], DO, art. 10 (IV), 22 de noviembre de 1884. 
 46. James Monroe, U.S. President, 7th Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823). 
 47. WILLIAM GILPIN, MISSION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
POLITICAL 124 (1873). 
 48. Mexican Proverbs, Famous Proverbs, SPECIAL DICTIONARY, http://www.special-dictionary.
com/proverbs/source/m/mexican_proverb/179403.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 49. ALAN C. HUFFINES, THE TEXAS WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1835–1836: FROM OUTBREAK TO THE 
ALAMO TO SAN JACINTO 60–61, 80–81 (2005). 
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not ratified by Mexico’s Congress), Texas became a U.S. state in December 1845.50 
Because the treaties have not been officially recognized, some Mexicans continue to 
view the loss of Texas as a U.S. intrusion on Mexican sovereignty that mirrors the 
theme of exploitation of Mexico’s natural resources by U.S. investors,51 thus helping 
to explain the nationalist sentiment against U.S. involvement in the Mexico 
petroleum sector. 
Craving California, New Mexico, and an expanded Texas border to the Rio 
Grande, the U.S. declared war on Mexico in 1846 in the midst of hostilities that 
began the prior year. U.S. forces seized Mexico City under the command of General 
Winfield Scott, pressuring Mexico into negotiations for a peace treaty. On February 
2, 1848, the U.S. achieved its “Manifest Destiny” through the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, ending the Mexican-American War (known in Mexico as la Primera 
Invasión/Intervención Estadounidense en México (“the First U.S. 
invasion/intervention in Mexico”). In return for this territory, the U.S. agreed to pay 
Mexico $15 million, assuming another $3.25 million in private American claims 
against Mexico.52 Taking advantage of Mexico’s financial and political turmoil, the 
U.S. purchased additional lands in what is now southwest New Mexico and southern 
Arizona for $10 million in 1853.53 The Gadsden Purchase or Venta de La Mesilla 
(Sale of La Mesilla) was made to facilitate construction of a railroad from Texas to 
California.54 Although postponed due to the American Civil War, the Southern 
Pacific Railroad was completed in 1883 as the second transcontinental line, serving 
to further unite U.S. territories from coast to coast while furthering resentment by 
Mexico owing to the loss of yet more land to the U.S.55 
Eight years after the Gadsden Purchase, while the U.S. was embroiled in 
civil war, the French, Spanish, and British invaded Mexico.56 The Franco-Mexican 
War, also known as the Segunda Intervención Francesa en México (Second French 
Intervention in Mexico),57 was waged to coerce Mexico into paying its foreign debts 
despite the fact that Mexico had been virtually bankrupted by the Mexican-American 
War.58 Although the Spanish and British forces withdrew after negotiating an 
agreement with President Benito Juárez,59 the French forces invaded Mexico City.60 
 
 50. Id. at 88. 
 51. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 210 (“To this date, Mexicans resent the loss of roughly 30 percent of 
‘their’ territory.”). 
 52. See generally JOHN C. DAVENPORT, THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE 
HIDALGO 48 (2005). 
 53. DAVID DEVINE, SLAVERY, SCANDAL, AND STEEL RAILS: THE 1854 GADSDEN PURCHASE AND 
THE BUILDING OF THE SECOND TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD ACROSS ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER 77 (2004). 
 54. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 213–14. 
 55. See id. For an example of the how some Mexicans view the U.S. as an aggressor, see, e.g., 
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/08/28/mexico-so-far-from-god-so-close-to-the-united-state
s.html (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 56. For more discussion see generally RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 223–26. 
 57. See generally RENÉ CHARTRAND, THE MEXICAN ADVENTURE 1861–67, at 272 (Lee Johnson ed., 
1994). 
 58. See RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 223. 
 59. Id. at 224. 
 60. Id. 
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Though never able to conquer Mexico, France temporarily installed Emperor 
Maximilian as the Habsburg monarch of Mexico from 1864–67.61 After the U.S. 
Civil War, the U.S. used diplomatic pressure and threatened military force to help 
bring an end to the French occupation (citing the Monroe Doctrine).62 Although this 
is an example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s assistance, the underlying reason was 
the U.S. desire to retain dominance in the Western Hemisphere. 
§ 20.04. PETROLEUM AND THE PORFIRIATO 
Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States. 
 
-Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico, 1876–1911 
One of the Mexican military heroes of Mexico’s struggles with the U.S. and 
France was José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz Mori, the figure most responsible for 
promoting petroleum development in Mexico. Prior to the Mexican-American War, 
José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz Mori (Porfirio Díaz) trained to become a priest,63 but 
enlisted in the military to repel the American invasion in 1846.64 After the war, Díaz 
became a radical liberal and studied law, later helping to overthrow Dictator-General 
Antonio López de Santa Anna, who had recently seized power in a coup.65 When 
Santa Anna was exiled, Díaz was offered a political post, only to return to the military 
to battle the French to oust Emperor Maximilian.66 Díaz later rebelled against two 
liberal presidents, President Benito Juárez and President Lerdo de Tejada.67 Díaz was 
elected President in 1876 and would remain in office until 191168—the longest term 
of any Mexican President. The extended presidency (known in Mexico as the 
“Porfiriato”), has been simultaneously interpreted as a period of relative stability and 
economic growth and as a dictatorship whose inequality and political suppression 
eventually erupted into the Mexican Revolution.69 
 
 61. Id. at 225–27; M. M. MCALLEN, MAXIMILIAN AND CARLOTA: EUROPE’S LAST EMPIRE IN 
MEXICO (2014). 
 62. Id; see also RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 224. 
 63. JAVIER A. GALVÁN, LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS OF THE 20TH CENTURY, THE LIVES AND 
REGIMES OF 15 RULERS 18 (2012). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 18–19. 
 66. Id. at 19. 
 67. Id. at 20. 
 68. Díaz handpicked his successor, who served until 1884 under Díaz’s thumb. See id. at 22. Díaz 
ran again for reelection and won in 1884, after which he obtained an amendment to the Constitution 
repealing the bar to reelection. Id. at 22–23. His downfall came when he pledged not to run for reelection 
in 1910 but changed his mind. Id. Díaz did allow Francisco Madero, a man with similar political leanings, 
to run against him; however, prior to the election, Díaz jailed Madero. Id. Officially-announced election 
results proclaimed Díaz had been re-elected by a wide margin, but Madero alleged fraud and encouraged 
a revolution. Id. at 27–28. Díaz fled Mexico in 1911 and somewhat ironically lived the remainder of his 
life in France—the country he fought against in the 1860s struggle that helped him rise to prominence. Id. 
at 28, 19. For alternative economic characterizations of the Porfiriato, see RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 
282–83. 
 69. For further biographical information, see generally GALVAN, supra note 63. For discussion of 
the concentration of wealth and the growing power of the small elite class in Mexico during the Porfiriato, 
see RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 239–43. 
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The Mexican Congress enacted a new petroleum law in 1884, giving 
landowners the right to exploit petroleum resources on their land.70 The nature and 
effect of the 1884 law would become the subject of long debate and controversy. 
One interpretation is that the 1884 law rejects the Spanish civil law concept of 
sovereign title over mineral resources in favor of the U.S. private-ownership 
approach to minerals, hastening the development of petroleum resources.71 Article 
10 provided: 
 
The following are the exclusive property of the owner of the land, 
who will therefore be able to exploit and use to their advantage 
without the need of a notification or special adjudgment: . . . The 
salts existing on the surface, pure and salt water on the surface or 
in the subsoil; the petroleum and gaseous springs or thermal and 
medicinal water.72 
 
Merrill Rippy argues that Article 10, along with Article 731 of the Mexican 
Civil Code, provided the surface owner with the right to exploit the subsoil and 
secure possession of produced petroleum but withheld title to the petroleum in situ.73 
Rippy also notes that some Mexican scholars believe that the Mexican government 
did not have authority to divest itself of mineral rights, as the 1857 Constitution 
empowered the government to regulate minerals, but not to divest them.74 An 1888 
organic law later confirmed federal control of public lands, navigable waters, and 
rivers and lakes forming boundaries between states, but neglected to repeal, amend, 
or clarify the 1884 law.75 
While federal control of public minerals remained in flux, the federal 
government clarified landowners’ rights to exploit in an 1892 law76 providing that 
landowners could exploit oil without having to secure government permission.77 The 
law declared that “the owner of the soil may exploit freely, without the necessity of 
a special concession in any case, the following mineral substances: Combustible 
 
 70. Código de Minas, DO, art. 10 (IV), 22 de noviembre de 1884. 
 71. See BERMÚDEZ, supra note 43, at 2. 
 72. Código de Minas, DO, art. 10 (IV), 22 de noviembre de 1884 (“son de la exclusiva propiedad del 
dueño del suelo, quien por lo mismo, sin necesidad de denuncio ni de adjudicación especial, podrá explotar 
y aprovechar: . . . IV. Las sales que existan en la superficie, las aguas puras y saladas, superficies o 
subterráneas, el petróleo y los mananatiales gaseosos o de aguas termales y medicinales . . . .”). 
 73. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 18 (citing Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República 
Mexicana, Comité Ejecutivo General, La Cuestión Petrolera: Sus Diversos Aspectos, 43–45 (1939), and 
like-minded commentators to support his argument). RIPPY, supra note 29, at 18–20. The term “in situ” 
means that the owner of the soil owns any minerals in place beneath the land as a possessory estate in 
land. Companies were apparently not content to argue for the more limited profit à prendre interest in 
which the owner of petroleum rights has the exclusive non-possessory property right to find and capture 
petroleum from beneath his land, acquiring possessory title as personal property only when the petroleum 
is actually produced. 
 74. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 20. 
 75. Id. at 48. 
 76. MEYER, supra note 19, at 24. 
 77. Id. 
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Minerals[,] Oil and mineral water . . . .”78 It further provided that “[m]ining property 
legally acquired and that which may be acquired under this law shall be irrevocable 
. . . .”79 and that exploitation  
in lands of private ownership of mineral explorations cannot be 
made without permission of the owner . . . [b]ut in case he cannot 
obtain this permission he shall be able to ask the appropriate 
administrative authority who shall give it in accordance with the 
established Regulation. . . .80 
The 1892 law also imposed a property tax, the nonpayment of which could result in 
loss of exploitation rights.81 Some scholars cite the 1892 law as conferring on 
landowners a free petroleum concession to exploit petroleum but not ownership in 
situ.82 Indeed, it arguably granted irrevocable exploitation rights only after the lands 
are exploited for petroleum. That the government claimed a right to grant 
administrative permission to exploit petroleum on private lands where private 
permission could not be obtained further indicates that the government had not fully 
divested itself of title to petroleum in situ, although today such a law might be 
regarded as regulatory in nature. 
In 1901, Mexico enacted a petroleum law that confirmed the rights of 
private landowners and authorized the federal government to grant concessions to 
federal and vacant land.83 The 1901 law included the beds of navigable waters, rivers, 
and lakes that formed a boundary between states.84 This law later fueled controversy 
when oil companies often drilled wells on private lands and drained nearby federal 
lands.85 Further, when third parties obtained concessions for federal lands overlaying 
productive oil fields, private lands were also subject to drainage.86 Though not 
expressly recognized in law, the rule of capture existed in fact. A proposed 1905 law 
would have reasserted government control of subsoil resources in line with Spanish 
Civil Law.87 This proposal was never enacted due to an opinion expressed by the 
 
 78. Ley Minera de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Mining Law of the United Mexican States], DO, 
art. 4, 4 de junio de 1892 (“el dueño del suelo explotará libremente sin necesidad de concesión especial 
en ningún caso, las substancias minerales siguientes: Los combustibles minerales. Los aceites y aguas 
minerales . . . .”); see also RIPPY, supra note 29, at 21; MEYER, supra note 19, at 24. 
 79. Ley Minera de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 78, at art. 5; see also RIPPY, supra note 
29, at 21. 
 80. Ley Minera de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 78, at art. 13 (“En terrenos de propiedad 
particular no podrán hacerse exploraciones mineras sin el permiso del dueño o de quien lo represente. 
Pero en el caso de que no se obtenga ese permiso, podrá pedirse a la autoridad administrativa 
correspondiente, quién lo dará de acuerdo con lo que establezca el Reglamento . . .”); see also RIPPY, 
supra note 29, at 21. 
 81. See Ley Minera de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 78, at arts. 5, 29; see also RIPPY, 
supra note 29, at 22. 
 82. See RIPPY, supra note 29, at 21. 
 83. Ley del Petróleo [Petroleum Law], DO, 24 de diciembre de 1901; see also BERMÚDEZ, supra 
note 43, at 3. 
 84. See Ley del Petróleo, art. 1, DO, 24 de diciembre de 1901. 
 85. See BERMÚDEZ, supra note 43, at 2. 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 23. 
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Mexican Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence, which concluded after debate 
that the law was impermissibly retroactive and thus contrary to the 1857 
Constitution.88 
Political debate about the meaning and effect of the 1884 law granting 
landowner mineral exploitation rights led the Mexican Congress to create a new 
mining law in 1909.89 The 1909 law affirmed and more clearly granted surface 
owners and their assignees exclusive property rights in subsoil petroleum resources 
that were previously stated in the 1884 law.90 Although the validity and exact 
meaning and effect of the 1884 and 1909 laws continued to be debated,91 oil 
companies and landowners interpreted it as a grant of irrevocable title to petroleum 
in situ beneath private lands, whether under lease or deed.92 
Although Díaz wanted to develop Mexico’s petroleum resources to reduce 
reliance on imported oil and oil products from Standard Oil Trust affiliate, Waters-
Pierce,93 the underlying motive for supporting these mineral laws was likely to 
cement his power. Díaz had previously participated in revolts to oust several 
conservative rulers and led revolts against two liberal presidents, and his ambiguous 
political loyalties suggest that he may have had early personal leadership aspirations. 
Díaz proved to be a master politician,94 courting favor and loyalty from the owners 
of haciendas (large estates or plantations), which became even larger under his 
presidency through mineral resources grants. The hacienda owners, apparently 
lacking the capital, expertise, and risk tolerance for petroleum exploration, were most 
willing to allow foreign capitalists the rights to explore for and exploit petroleum 
resources in return for a share of the wealth.95 Nevertheless, no major discoveries 
would be made until the 1900s. 
 
Oil had come into the hole in such quantity as to lift the tools off 
the bottom and interrupt drilling. 
 
-Edward Doheny, American Oilman96 
 
 
 88. Id. at 26. 
 89. Id. at 26–28. 
 90. Id. at 26. 
 91. Id. at 27–28 (offering a brief discussion of subsequent debate in Mexico among the legal academy 
as to the meaning and effect of the 1909 law). 
 92. See RIPPY, supra note 29, at 26–27. 
 93. See JONATHAN C. BROWN, OIL AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO 13, 9–29 (1993); see also MEYER, 
supra note 19, at 4 (noting that Díaz was also anxious to reduce imports of coal). Díaz’s distrust of 
Standard was mutual, as during the Díaz regime, Standard Oil was the only American business that was 
anti-Díaz. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 323. 
 94. For the next twenty-six years, Díaz ruled essentially as an authoritarian dictator, eliminating local 
government and federalism, controlling the legislative and judicial branches, and suppressing the press. 
GALVAN, supra note 63, at 21–28. He maintained power through pacifying the lower classes with political 
patronage, halting suppression of the native population, being neutral regarding the Roman Catholic 
Church, and allowing the wealthier classes to maintain their wealth. Id. at 21–22, 25–26. Much of this 
was inconsistent with his prior radical liberalism. Id. at 21. He also embraced European culture, art, and 
architecture, transforming Mexico City into a European-style capital city. Id. at 25. 
 95. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 279. 
 96. BROWN, supra note 93, at 29 (recounting his first Mexican well). 
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In 1900, Edward Doheny, an American oilman already famous for 
commercially developing the Los Angeles City oil field in the 1890s,97 began 
exploring for oil in Mexico. Doheny was asked to investigate rumors about oil pits 
near Tampico, along the Mexican Central Railroad’s right-of-way.98 To facilitate oil 
exploration, Doheny secured a right to import equipment duty free and, except for a 
stamp tax, a tax exemption on oil production for ten years.99 In return, Doheny gave 
Díaz 508 preferred shares of stock in his company.100 Doheny drilled the first 
commercial oil well in Mexico in 1901 in what would become the El Ebano oil field 
in the state of San Luis Potosí.101 In 1916, he drilled the giant Cerro Azul No. 4 well 
near Casiano, then the world’s largest well, initially producing 260,000 barrels per 
day.102 Doheny’s oil holdings were held in the Pan American Petroleum and 
Transport Company, which held the Mexican production in two affiliates, Mexican 
Petroleum and Huasteca.103 
Being a deft politician, Díaz did not wish to become overly beholden to or 
dependent upon American investors. For good reasons, including the annexations of 
Texas, California, and the now-U.S. Southwest, Díaz cautiously promoted American 
investment. Díaz also encouraged European investors to counter balance American 
investment, causing English engineer, Sir Weetman Pearson, to become a major oil 
investor and Díaz favorite.104 
 
I entered lightly on this enterprise, not realizing its many problems, 
but only feeling that oil meant a fortune and that hard work and 
application would bring satisfactory results. 
 
-Sir Weetman Pearson, British Industrialist105 
 
Sir Weetman Pearson was a leading global construction engineer and 
entrepreneur.106 What initially brought Pearson to Mexico were his prior 
involvements in several Mexican projects for President Díaz including the 
construction of the first Mexican coast-to-coast railroad, the harbor at Vera Cruz, 
and Mexico City’s Grand Canal.107 
 
 97. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 82, 229. See, e.g., Discovering Los Angeles Oilfields, AMERICAN OIL 
& GAS HISTORICAL SOC’Y (2016), http://aoghs.org/states/los-angeles-oil-fields. 
 98. BROWN, supra note 93, at 27. 
 99. See BROWN, supra note 93, at 28; RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 280 (mentioning the stamp tax 
exemption). 
 100. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 280. 
 101. BROWN, supra note 93, at 29. 
 102. Id. at 128. 
 103. Id. at 132. Doheny would later become embroiled in the infamous Teapot Dome scandal in the 
United States, but notwithstanding rather damning evidence, he was acquitted of bribery charges in 
connection with the scandal. See id. at 135; see also YERGIN, supra note 1, at 229; see Edward L. Doheny, 
WEST ADAMS HERITAGE ASS’N, http://www.westadamsheritage.org/read/472 (last visited May 27, 2016). 
 104. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 230. 
 105. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 231. 
 106. Id. at 229. 
 107. Id. at 230. 
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Pearson began investing in Mexico oil prospects in 1901 when he missed a 
rail connection into Mexico at Laredo, Texas.108 While in Laredo, Pearson observed 
the oil frenzy that had spread across south Texas due to the Spindletop discovery 
near Beaumont earlier that year.109 Pearson’s Mexican oil prospects included 
properties in the Tabasco region.110 Pearson even enlisted the aid of Captain Anthony 
Lucas, who was responsible for the Spindletop discovery, to help manage his 
operations in Mexico.111 Díaz granted Pearson “a 50-year oil concession on national 
lands, lakes, and lagoons in six states including oil-rich Veracruz.”112 By 1906 
Pearson claimed to own about 600,000 acres that were prospective for oil and leases 
covering an additional 200,000 to 300,000 acres113 He also received a 50-year tax 
exemption.114 Both Pearson and Doheny were further protected by tariffs on 
imported crude,115 and both acquired exploration and development rights from 
private landowners and concessions from the government for federal and vacant 
land. Together their respective oil holdings would provide over 90 percent of 
Mexican oil production by 1911.116 
Until 1910, Pearson—by then also known as “Lord Cowdray”—
experienced little success, although he drilled one spectacular well that caught fire 
and cratered in 1908.117 However, through the work of Pearson’s new geology 
consultant, Everette DeGolyer,118 Pearson completed the Potrero del Llano # 4 drill 
which flowed at 110,000 barrels per day.119 As a result of this discovery, Pearson’s 
year old enterprise, Compañía Mexicana de Petróleo El Aguila SA (Mexican Eagle), 
became one of the world’s leading oil companies.120 Mexico would also become a 
major petroleum nation due to the ensuing development of oil production in 
Mexico’s “Golden Lane” near Tampico.121 By 1911, Mexico was major oil 
producer.122 The timing of Mexico’s oil boom came just in time to provide fuel for a 
very fuel-thirsty World War I and valuable political capital for Mexico. 
Despite (and perhaps in part due to) his success in stimulating oil production 
in Mexico, President Díaz was ousted and the Mexican Revolution began only one 
 
 108. Id. at 230–31. 
 109. Id. at 230. 
 110. Id. at 231. 
 111. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 231. 
 112. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 280. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Stephen Haber et al., When the Law Does Not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil 
Industry, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 5 [hereinafter Haber] (2003), http://stephen-haber.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/02/Haber-Maurer-Razo-When-the-Law.pdf. 
 115. Id. at 1, 4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at, 280–81. 
 118. See Biography of Everette Lee DeGolyer, Sr., TEXAS ARCHIVAL RESOURCES ONLINE, SOUTHERN 
METHODIST UNIV., http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/smu/00003/smu-00003.html (last visited May 27, 
2016). 
 119. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 231. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See generally id. at 229–33. 
 122. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 281. 
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year before the completion of the Potrero del Llano #4.123 Díaz fled into exile on 
May 25, 1911, the very day that significant volumes of oil were first exported from 
Mexico,124 and the year when Mexico became the fourth largest oil producer in the 
world.125  
Although Díaz remains controversial in Mexican history, his contributions 
to the Mexican economy were significant. During his presidency, he used his 
exceptional political prowess to build a coalition of support that led to over thirty 
years of relative stability in a country that had previously suffered protracted political 
turmoil. Thanks to this stability, the Mexican economy flourished in large part due 
to foreign investment, especially in the petroleum sector. Nevertheless, the seeds of 
destruction for foreign petroleum investors had been sown as political opposition to 
private ownership grew during the intellectual debate over the meaning and effect of 
the 1884 mining law.126 “The goals of the Mexican Revolution lacked clarity,”127 but 
the desires for agricultural reform, uplifting labor, and protecting Mexico’s 
indigenous peoples128 were contrary to the interests of hacienda owners, including 
their asserted private ownership of mineral rights.129 Private ownership of petroleum 
resources ended by law with the revolutionary constitution in 1917, but that change 
would not be fully implemented for another twenty-one years when private 
investors’ oil properties were expropriated by the government. 
§ 20.05. THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION AND THE GOLDEN LANE 
The ensuing violence of the Mexican Revolution,130 which included some 
acts against foreign oil managers and disruption of the oil fields,131 served to slow 
oil development for a time, but by and large, the oil industry flourished and prospered 
during the Revolution.132 The oil industry weathered the Revolution in part due to 
the oil industry’s mostly coastal location and because the quarreling revolutionary 
factions apparently understood that oil development and oil exports were vital to 
Mexico’s future.133 While overall U.S. investment declined in the early years of the 
revolution, oil investment increased.134 Indeed, “[a]ll of the revolutionary leaders 
refrained from damaging oil production facilities because they hoped to tax 
petroleum.”135 Moreover, “no revolutionary leader wanted to offend the U.S. and 
 
 123. Id. at 280. 
 124. See BROWN, supra note 93, at 100. 
 125. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 282. 
 126. For a discussion of the consolidation of land into large haciendas during the Díaz presidency, see 
MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 2; see also RIPPY, supra note 29; BERMUDEZ, supra note 43. 
 127. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 315 (noting the lack of “overall coordination of combatants, some of 
whom fought for opposing goals”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 296–98; MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 2. 
 130. The Revolution might be better described as a series of revolutions and movements. RUSSELL, 
supra note 23, at 313. 
 131. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 231. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 232. 
 134. See RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 317. 
 135. Id. at 320. 
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British governments by attacking property of their citizens.”136 Indeed, Mexico 
became the world’s second largest producer in 1915137 and then again in 1921, 
estimated to supply about 25% of the world’s petroleum.138 The Mexican Revolution 
began in 1910 and lasted until about 1920, and coincided with the Mexican oil boom 
in the oil-rich Golden Lane.139 From 1910 to 1921, the oil investors’ rate of return 
on their capital investments has been estimated to have risen from 8% in 1910 to 
60% by 1921.140 
From the time of the ouster of Díaz in 1911, Mexico would remain 
politically unstable until 1929—suffering revolution, civil war, coups and attempted 
coups, and the assassination of a president. The first post- Díaz President, Francisco 
Madero, imposed Mexico’s first real taxes on petroleum production and exports.141 
Otherwise, he was not outwardly antagonistic to the foreign oil companies;142 
however, the oil companies were outraged by the tax, called it confiscatory, and 
eventually negotiated a lower rate.143He also decreed that the oil companies should 
register their holdings and provide information about their value.144 For the most 
part, oil companies ignored or evaded the increased taxes and largely refused to 
register their claims.145 Madero tried to be moderate leader and saw the revolution as 
about free elections.146 While a National Agrarian Commission only studied land 
reform, it caused both land-reform revolutionaries and the elite to oppose him.147 
Madero was killed in February 1913.148 
José Victoriano Huerta Márquez, one of Madero’s generals who had turned 
against him, took power in 1913 with the backing of elite classes, including the 
British oil interests and U.S. business interests.149 Venustiano Carranza soon led a 
revolt of “Constitutionalists.”150 Carranza and the competing revolutionary Pancho 
Villa forced Huerta to resign in July 1914.151 Following the fall of Huerta, Mexico 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Haber, supra note 114, at 1; see generally Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, and Armando Razo, 
When Institutions Don’t Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry (unpublished 
manuscript presented at the Economic History Seminar at UC Berkeley, September 2001), http://
web.stanford.edu/class/polisci313/papers/Haber-RazoFeb25.pdf. 
 139. Haber, supra note 114, at 1. 
 140. MEYER, supra note 19, at 13. 
 141. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 323 (“When Madero announced the new tax . . . oilmen became 
furious. They clamed [sic] the tax was confiscatory and equaled 17 percent of their profits. This was an 
outrageous lie, but it made good newspaper copy.”). 
 142. MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 2. The establishment of a national oil company was considered in 
1913. RIPPY, supra note 29 at 29 (citing MANUEL FLORES, APUNTES SOBRE EL PETRÓLEO MEXICANO 33 
(1913)). 
 143. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 323. 
 144. MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 2. 
 145. See BROWN, supra note 93, at 231. 
 146. See RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 300. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 302. 
 149. Id. at 303. 
 150. Id. 
 151. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 307. 
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suffered two years of civil war as various competing groups fought for power.152 
During brief periods during the 1910s, but especially in this period of civil war, 
various revolutionaries would occupy oil territory and interfere with tax collection,153 
while simultaneously coercing oil companies to give them “loans.”154 In other 
instances, oil personnel were simply robbed.155 During the civil war period, Carranza 
largely controlled the area along the Golden Lane and thus secured a steady supply 
of oil revenues.156 When he finally defeated his enemies, he began to rebuild a 
centralized state,157 which led to a new Constitution in 1917.158 
During this tumultuous period, oil companies sought both diplomatic and 
military aid from the U.S. and Great Britain. Thus, the numerous Mexican 
governments of this period were constantly faced with the prospects of foreign 
military intervention or inability to collect taxes whenever considering implementing 
new taxes and duties.159 Even U.S. President Wilson—who typically favored moral 
over dollar diplomacy—briefly invaded Mexico in 1914; although he did so to topple 
President Huerta rather than protect oil companies.160 While in power, Huerta tried 
to substantially raise oil taxes, which caused U.S. oil interests to turn against him as 
President Wilson had already done.161 
In 1914, the next ruler and later president José Venustiano Carranza Garza 
began to take steps to restore ownership of oil in the nation,162 and levied a bar tax 
payable in gold.163 In 1915, he ordered all oil development halted that was not done 
with permission of the Constitutionalist government, pending a new oil law and even 
tried to embargo oil exports to force payment of taxes by the oil companies.164 In 
1916, foreign oil companies were advised by decree that they could claim no greater 
privileges than Mexican nationals and that they would have to declare themselves 
Mexican, a decree similar to the Calvo Doctrine, first enunciated by Carlos Calvo, 
an Argentine jurist in 1868.165 Additional taxes, including special taxes on exported 
oil, were levied in 1917.166 When the oil companies ignored these decrees, President 
Carranza threatened occupation of the Tampico oilfields.167 Following vigorous 
diplomatic protests from the U.S. and Great Britain, Carranza cancelled his 
 
 152. Id. at 307–312. 
 153. BROWN, supra note 93, at 186–90 (discussing taxation efforts and failures during the presidency 
of José Victoriano Huerta Márquez in 1913–1916). 
 154. See BROWN, supra note 93, at 178–79, 181–84, 186. See also RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 320. 
 155. Id. at 209. 
 156. RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 309. 
 157. Id. at 312. 
 158. Id. at 312. 
 159. See BROWN, supra note 93, at 177–90; MEYER, supra note 19, at 52. 
 160. Id. at 192–94. In 1916, Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing to invade northern Mexico to 
capture General Francisco “Pancho” Villa for a raid on Columbus, New Mexico. Pershing failed to find 
Villa but this invasion damaged U.S.-Mexico relations. MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
 161. MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 2; See RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 325. 
 162. MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
 163. Id. at ch. 3. 
 164. BROWN, supra note 93, at 216–19; see also MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 4. 
 165. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 32; see id. at 86; see also MEYER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
 166. Id. at 33. 
 167. Id. 
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occupation plans.168 The threat of U.S. military intervention on behalf of the oil 
companies ended with the U.S.’s entry into World War I. 
§ 20.06. THE 1917 CONSTITUTION AND AFTERMATH 
[I]t is necessary to revise in a manner complete and radical 
the petroleum legislation of the country . . . . 
 
-Venustiano Carranza, President of Mexico, 1917–1920169 
 
1917 was a pivotal year for the world and for Mexican oil. The static trench 
warfare of World War I was finally over and the collapse of the Russian Empire 
brought Lenin and his Marxist Bolsheviks to power.170 And although the U.S. was 
the world’s largest petroleum producer—producing over two-thirds of world 
output—U.S. officials were worried that the country was running out of oil: “in 1917, 
the surging demand for American oil began to hit the limit of available supplies. The 
gap was being closed only by using up inventories and by importing more oil from 
Mexico.”171 British politicians were even more concerned about oil supplies, as Great 
Britain relied on oil imports from distant oil-producing regions in the Middle East, 
Asia, the U.S., and Mexico.172 The concern over oil supplies was both strategic and 
economic, as the U.S. and Great Britain had already converted their navies from coal 
to petroleum prior to the outbreak of World War I.173 
Amidst World War I, on February 5, 1917, the revolutionary Mexican 
Constitutional Congress enacted a new Constitution.174 Article 76 created a strong 
presidency,175 but Article 83 prohibited re-election.176 Article 3 decreed compulsory 
free education, but provided no means of accomplishing this goal.177 Article 23 
provided strong labor rights and protected “legal” strikes.178 Article 27 of the 
Constitution, previously approved during the early hours of the days before, 
addressed land reform and asserted government sovereign title over petroleum 
resources thereby revoking the Díaz concept of private ownership: 
 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. RIPPY, supra note 29, at 30 (quoting Decree, President Venustiano Carranza (Jan. 1915)). 
 170. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 237. 
 171. Id. at 178. 
 172. See YERGIN, supra note 1 at 173–78; see RUSSELL, supra note 23, at 320. 
 173. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 173. The strategic importance of this decision was proven during 
the war, as the German navy still depended largely on coal, which limited maneuverability, speed, and 
distance of travel. Id. Petroleum and Sea Power, AMERICAN OIL & GAS HIST. SOC., http://aoghs.org/
petroleum-in-war/petroleum-and-sea-power/ (last visited May 26, 2016) (the U.S. began the switch before 
GB after the Spanish American War). 
 174. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Edición Oficial, DO, 5 de febrero 
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 175. RUSSELL, supra note 23, 335. 
 176. Id. at 335. 
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In the nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or 
substances which in veins, layers, masses, or beds constitute 
deposits whose nature is different from components of the land. 
Such as minerals from which metals and metalloids used for 
industrial purposes are extracted; beds of precious stones, rock salt 
and salt lakes formed directly by marine waters, products derived 
from decomposition of rocks when their exploitation requires 
underground work; phosphates used for fertilizers; solid mineral 
fuels; petroleum and all hydro-carbons—solid, liquid, or 
gaseous.179 
 
Article 27 authorized the federal government to issue concessions to private 
investors, including foreign investors.180 The general intent was to return control over 
subsoil petroleum to the government, as had been the case prior to creation of the 
1884 mining law. However, the text remained ambiguous about whether the 
amendment was intended to have retroactive effect in established and prospective 
fields. One provision of the Constitution, Article 14, provided that “no law shall be 
given retroactive effect to the prejudice of any person whatsoever[,]”181 while Article 
27 permitted the federal government to exercise “direct dominion over all minerals 
or substances . . . .”182 These seemingly inconsistent provisions, coupled with oil 
company resistance backed by the threat of American and British intervention on the 
companies’ behalf, resulted in a sort of “Mexican standoff.”183 Another twenty-one 
years would lapse before this question was finally settled. Nevertheless, to the 
foreign oil investors, Article 27 was a line in the sand that came to represent a coming 
world-wide struggle between sovereignty over natural resources on the one hand and 
the sanctity and stability of contracts on the other hand. This struggle got underway 
in earnest during and after World War II and continued on through the 1980s, 
including in South America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 
Carranza was the first president elected under the 1917 Constitution.184 
Overall, he was not a reformer,185 but he did increase oil taxes by seven-fold and 
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tried to implement Article 27.186 To counter Article 27, oil companies formed several 
lobbying organizations. The principal groups were the Association of Foreign Oil 
Producers, the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in 
Mexico, and the American Association of Mexico (AAM).187 These organizations 
lobbied in both Mexico and the U.S., in the latter case seeking diplomatic and 
sometimes military intervention.188 To counter the threat of military intervention, 
Mexican governments threatened to destroy the oilfields before the American 
military could secure them.189 Mexican governments also remained fearful that the 
U.S. might supply arms to revolutionaries opposed to the government.190 Moreover, 
in feeding this unease, the U.S. failed to recognize formally most of the governments 
that came to power during the period after Carranza.191 After Carranza was 
assassinated in 1920192 and following a brief provisional presidency of Adolfo de la 
Huerta, General Álvaro Obregón, a former Carranza ally who turned against him, 
was elected president.193 Obregón implemented limited land reform and embraced in 
rhetoric labor unions.194 His hand-picked successor, Plutarco Elías Calles,195 was 
elected with over 90% of the vote in 1924.196 He implemented further land reform 
but became more conservative near the end of his term.197 After the Calles term 
ended in 1928, the Constitution was amended to allow Obregón to return to office 
for a six-year term;198 however, Obregón was assassinated before he took office.199 
Calles’s Interior Minister, Emilio Portes Gil, became provisional president.200 Calles 
then formed the PNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Party)201 and served as the power 
behind the throne for the remainder of Gil’s term and for the term of Pascual Ortiz 
Rubio,202 who appears to have been fraudulently elected.203 After a disagreement 
with Calles, Rubio was replaced by Abelardo Rodriquez in 1932204 and served until 
1934. 
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Between 1918 and 1925, a series of presidential decrees attempted to 
implement Article 27.205 Implementation failed when oil companies refused to 
comply with the decrees and Mexican officials were unable to agree upon a uniform 
interpretation of Article 27 of the Constitution. The Mexican government would have 
likely compromised during this period, but the oil companies’ firmly insisted that the 
oil in situ belonged to them, preventing all efforts to implement Article 27. Instead, 
the companies, along with the U.S. and British governments, vigorously protested 
any effort to implement Article 27. 
The oil companies eventually litigated their claims. The Texas Company 
sought and secured what it regarded as a favorable ruling from the Mexico Supreme 
Court on the question of retroactivity.206 The court held in 1921 that in order for 
Article 27 to be applied retroactively, retroactive intent must be clearly contemplated 
by the language of the provision and then enforced retroactively by appropriate 
authorities.207 By 1919, the courts had taken approximately eighty recursos de 
amparo (writs of protection)208 against the decrees issued to implement Article 27.209 
Seemingly bringing to an end the series of abortive attempts, the first law 
implementing Article 27 was finally enacted in 1925.210 The 1925 law provided a 
means by which companies could acquire new concessions from the government 
consistent with Article 27. Regarding company rights that pre-dated the 1917 
reforms, the new law provided for the issuance of confirmation concessions at no 
cost (1) for rights “arising from lands in which works of petroleum exploitation were 
begun prior to May 1, 1917” and (2) for rights “arising from contracts made before 
May 1, 1917 by the surface owner . . . for express purpose of exploitation of 
petroleum” for not more than fifty years.211 
Despite the conciliatory nature of the law, many companies refused to 
request confirmatory concessions. This resulted in part because some oil companies 
were concerned that “works of petroleum exploitation” (or “positive acts”) required 
actual drilling212 and found unacceptable the fifty-year limit under the alternative 
means of confirmation (despite the fact that a fifty-year period would have exceeded 
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the economic life of any existing reservoirs). 213 Even the U.S. Senate urged that the 
matter be resolved by international arbitration.214 President Calles responded by 
cancelling drilling permits and referring the matter to his Attorney General for 
enforcement.215 
The companies responded by drilling without permits.216 When Calles 
sealed the wells, the companies broke the seals.217 Troops entered and resealed the 
wells.218 To end the stalemate, oil companies reached out to the U.S. to intervene, 
suspended drilling operations, and provoked a financial crisis by withdrawing their 
Mexican bank deposits.219 In 1927, the Mexican government enacted a new 
regulation providing a more liberal definition of “works of petroleum exploitation,” 
in the hope that the regulation would defuse the situation.220 The regulation failed to 
satisfy the companies. Also in 1927, the Mexican Supreme Court, perhaps at 
President Calles’ urging, held that oil companies’ pre-existing contract rights could 
be limited in duration only as specified in the contract,221 thus freeing the oil 
companies from the fifty-year production limit.222 Despite an amendment of the 1927 
regulation to comply with this decision, the oil companies continued to resist, 
perhaps believing that they could exact greater concessions from the then-weak 
Mexican government.223 
In 1927, President Calles considered the threat of American military 
intervention so serious that he ordered General Lázaro Cárdenas to make 
preparations to set the oilfields on fire if the U.S. invaded.224 Ironically, American 
bankers, who had previously loaned money to the Mexican government and viewed 
petroleum revenues as a means of repayment, may have prevented a military 
intervention.225 Calles entered into negotiations with the U.S. after President 
Coolidge reaffirmed that American business interests in foreign countries were 
entitled to U.S. protection and threatened to arm revolutionaries opposing Calles.226. 
The 1928 U.S.-Mexico Calles-Morrow agreement resulted.227 This agreement 
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allowed oil firms to retain their pre-1917 holdings but also largely affirmed the 1925 
law as amended.228 
In the period between 1917 and 1925, control of Mexican oil production 
passed to other oil companies. The lack of stability in Mexico caused Pearson to 
become so disillusioned that he sold a substantial interest in and turned over 
management responsibilities for Mexican Eagle to Royal Dutch Shell in 1918.229 
Shell’s investment would quickly turn sour when salt water intrusion greatly 
diminished production in mature wells.230 Doheny, too, remained in Mexico only 
until 1925, when he sold Pan American to Standard Oil of Indiana,231 which later 
sold its Mexican and other foreign production to Standard Oil of New Jersey.232 
Jersey had already made substantial investments in Mexico in the 1910s.233 By 1925, 
most of Mexico’s oil production was controlled by major companies, including 
Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil Corporation, Sinclair, City 
Services, and Warner-Quinla.234 Small foreign and Mexican independents were also 
active in Mexico but they collectively produced less than 10% of Mexico’s oil from 
1901 to 1938, and Mexican investment capital was never more 3% of total oil 
investments.235 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the resistance that arose from 
the adoption of Article 27 in 1917. Due to the uncertainty of investments, owing to 
the many interpretations of Article 27 and a series of new taxes and regulations, the 
oil companies were reluctant to address the salt-water intrusion problem with more 
capital, improved technology, and additional exploration.236 Mexican oil production 
peaked in 1921, the same year Mexico became the world’s second largest 
producer.237 Daniel Yergin concludes that the tensions of the 1920s caused oil 
production in Mexico to plummet because foreign investors moved new capital to 
Venezuela, where the oil companies had found new reserves and a more favorable 
investment climate.238 Because of declining Mexican production and the movement 
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of investment capital to Venezuela, Venezuela quickly replaced Mexico as the 
world’s second largest oil producer.239 
Although petroleum production increased through 1921 and petroleum 
investment increased through 1925, reservoir depletion, continuing investor concern 
over the stability of entitlements, and new larger oil discoveries in Venezuela and 
elsewhere all created a strong enough disincentive to weather the uncertainty in 
Mexico. By 1930, Mexican production had declined to 20% of the 1921 peak.240 In 
nine years, Mexico fell from supplying 25% of the world’s oil production to just 
3%.241 
It is difficult to identify any singular cause. Political instability, the end 
private ownership, and increased taxes all played a role in this decline, though some 
recent studies have concluded that reservoir depletion was the main contributing 
factor.242 On the other hand, some scholars have argued that reservoir depletion could 
have been arrested with investment in new technology.243 Investors preferred the 
more favorable investment climate in Venezuela, in light of Mexico’s uncertain 
political atmosphere.244 Others argue that both political instability and reservoir 
depletion played roles.245 While saltwater intrusion had caused a sharp decline in 
production, the question remains whether oil companies would have invested more 
in exploration and modern production practices if the political environment in 
Mexico had been less hostile. 
The Haber economic study rejects the idea that production declined due to 
company fears about the implementation of Article 27. Rather, companies continued 
to invest until they realized that Mexico had simply run out of oil.246 The Mexican 
governments of this period were weak compared to the large, foreign-owned, 
mobilized, and well-organized oil companies.247 These circumstances empowered oil 
companies with what the authors cite as “two powerful weapons:”248 first, the ability 
to seek diplomatic intervention, the threat of military intervention to protect their 
interests and the threat that the U.S. might arm opposition revolutionary forces within 
Mexico;249 and second, at a time when the government lacked the expertise and 
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technology to operate the oilfields on its own, the companies threatened production 
boycotts and curtailments250 to reduce government tax revenues.251 The Haber study 
examines production data,252 petroleum export data,253 drilling data,254 land data,255 
investment data,256 and petroleum equipment import data.257 Comparing petroleum 
profits and tax burdens, the study also concludes that increasing tax burdens during 
the Carranza presidency did not significantly affect profits.258 
Although the Haber Study is compelling, the divestment was not due to a 
single cause. For example, the drilling data shows a drilling success rate ranging 
from 60% to 76% with an initial per-well capacity ranging from 9,100 to nearly 
25,000 barrels per day from 1918 to 1922.259 These figures suggest that the 
companies were drilling development wells to increase drainage and thus maximize 
their production during the time remaining before implementation of Article 27. This 
drilling may have accelerated the saltwater intrusion and ultimate decline in 
production thereafter. After 1922, drilling success rates declined substantially, both 
in terms of dry holes and initial per-well productive capacities to lows of 36% and 
1,900 barrels per day respectively in 1927, suggesting that more step out or 
exploration wells were being drilled260 By then, oil companies were more confident 
that Article 27 would be implemented in a manner that would protect their 
investments. Moreover, the companies were able to hedge their bets by showing 
“positive acts” to preserve their rights.261 The Haber study does, however, 
demonstrate that overproduction contributed to oil companies’ loss of interest. 
Scholars can only speculate about whether oil companies would have continued 
investing in drilling in new regions and formations in Mexico had Article 27 not been 
implemented. 
Despite Article 27, oil development expanded through the 1930s, once the 
Mexican political climate settled. 1929 marked the beginning of a new era of relative 
political stability under the leadership of leftist presidents, in particular Lázaro 
Cárdenas del Río, who took office in 1934.262 Mexican production increased by 
1934263 after discovery of the El Aguila (Mexican Eagle) oil field at Poza Rica in 
1929.264 Production increased again through 1937.265 The oil struggles of past years 
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seemed to have subsided. However, a rise in the popularity of agrarian land reform 
led to labor unrest in the oil fields, and the ultimate expropriation of oil company 
investments in 1938,266 which arguably represents the true culmination of the 
Mexican Revolution. 
With increased production in the 1930s, consolidation of Mexico labor 
unions in the petroleum sector, and left-leaning governments with agrarian-based 
agendas, even the modest gains made by oil companies in the Calles-Morrow 
agreement began to unravel.267 During this time, Mexican Eagle had been fully 
transferred to Royal Dutch Shell and accounted for about 65% of Mexican 
production.268 American oil companies, including Jersey, Sinclair, Cities Service, 
and Gulf, provided approximately 30% of production.269 Despite the Mexican oil 
industry’s remaining concentrated in foreign companies, the oil companies 
overestimated their political capital and the effectiveness of ignoring undesirable 
Mexico government mandates. Times had changed. 
§ 20.07 THE 1938 EXPROPRIATION AND AFTERMATH 
[The oil company officials were] men without respect who were 
unaccustomed to speaking the truth. 
 
-Jesús Silva Herzog, Review Commission Member270 
 
The matter was so important as a precedent in other areas that the 
company would prefer to lose everything it had in Mexico rather 
than acquiesce in a partnership which might be regarded as a 
partial expropriation. 
 
-Eugene Holman, Jersey Production Manager271 
 
Several factors facilitated a government takeover of Mexican petroleum 
resources. These include the Great Depression and massive production in the East 
Texas field, which caused oil prices to fall precipitously after 1930; the rise of Nazi 
Germany; the confiscation of Jersey properties in Bolivia in 1937; renewed 
revolutionary fervor in Mexico; the consolidation of Mexican labor unions in the 
petroleum sector in 1935; and President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. 
General Lázaro Cárdenas, who had orders to prepare to set fire to the oil fields a 
decade earlier, was now president and in a position to complete what had begun with 
the Constitution of 1917.272 For Mexican nationalists, Cardenas was the right person 
at the right time. 
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President Cárdenas fashioned a political machine, the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), that would run Mexico through the 1980s. 
Cárdenas’s nationalist rhetoric included a jealous protection of Mexico’s oil. The 
U.S. government’s disinterest in Mexican oil during the period helped to bolster 
Mexican control over its oil interests. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was more 
immediately concerned with the U.S. economy in the midst of crisis and early signs 
of World War II in Europe. Given the low cost and plentiful supply of oil in the 
1930s, Mexican oil was no longer a crucial resource for the U.S.273 Roosevelt’s 
attention turned to preserving relations with Mexico, fearing long-term consequences 
more than the immediate loss of oil.274 
By 1935, the major oil producing states in the U.S. had been given 
regulatory authority to curtail production under the Interstate Oil Compact.275 Supply 
was so plentiful that major oil producers colluded in the Red Line Agreement to 
discourage exploration within the old Ottoman Empire, and a few had colluded in 
the “As Is Agreement” to freeze their world market shares.276 In short, the world was 
awash in oil and causing oil companies to be less concerned about their Mexican 
holdings. Free from pressure from the U.S. government and American oil companies, 
the Mexican government had the opportunity to amend oil production laws according 
to the nationalist agenda. 
In 1937, in the midst of heightened nationalist popularity, the Mexican oil 
workers’ union went on strike.277 Wages for Mexicans working in the oil industry 
had long been approximately half of what foreign oil workers in Mexico earned.278 
Mexican oil workers also lacked job security. The Federal Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration appointed a government commission, headed by Jesus Silva Herzog, to 
recommend terms for settlement of the strikes.279 In view of the disparities, Silva 
Herzog’s commission suggested substantially increased wages, a forty-hour work 
week, six weeks of vacation, retirement pensions at age fifty, and the gradual 
replacement of all foreign workers with Mexican workers within a two-year span.280 
Oil companies, however, rejected the commission’s recommendations in their 
entirety, grossly underestimating Cárdenas’s willingness to expropriate Mexican oil 
production.281 
Cárdenas affirmed the commission’s recommendations in all respects, 
adding retroactive interest,282 and the Mexican Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
commission’s recommendations.283 Cárdenas then entered negotiations with oil 
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companies, which ended in a stalemate. On March 16, 1938, Cárdenas declared oil 
companies “in rebellion.”284 He formally expropriated their holdings two days 
later.285 On June 7, 1938, Cárdenas replaced Petromex, a partially state-owned 
company that controlled approximately two percent of Mexican oil production, with 
a new state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex).286 In 1940, the law 
implementing Article 27 of the Mexico Constitution was amended to prohibit the 
granting of new hydrocarbon concessions.287 
British companies responded by leading a market embargo of Mexican oil 
and by refusing to provide materials, equipment, supplies, and services to Pemex.288 
The embargo damaged the Mexican economy and its oil sector, while at the same 
time bolstering nationalist opposition to foreign oil companies.289 The embargo 
induced Mexico to make use of its own oil resources, ultimately enabling Mexico to 
industrialize.290 It also fueled demand for Mexican oil in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, 
and Imperial Japan, Mexico’s best oil customers.291 The British government 
aggressively defended Mexican Eagle and other British investors, causing Mexico to 
sever diplomatic relations.292 
Fearing German, Italian, and Japanese influence in Mexico, the U.S. 
government was less willing to come to the aid of American oil companies operating 
in Mexico.293 Shortly before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt 
administration pushed for a settlement of American claims. In 1942, a joint U.S.-
Mexico commission awarded U.S. oil companies $30 million of the total $408 
million asserted.294 The U.S. oil companies grudgingly accepted the award in 
October, 1943.295 British oil companies fared substantially better, prolonging 
settlement with the Mexican government until 1947. Mexican Eagle, alone, was 
awarded $132.8 million.296 While oil companies, generally, notably the U.S. 
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companies, believed the settlements were inadequate, one economic scholar has 
concluded that the companies were actually over-compensated, considering their 
declining profits and production at the time of the expropriation.297 
Mexico continues to celebrate the expropriation of March 18, 1938 as a day 
of great historical importance and a symbol of national sovereignty. However, 
Mexico and its oil workers also paid a heavy price for expropriation: Mexican oil 
workers never received wage increases298—in fact, wages were cut.299 Only during 
the heightened demand of World War II did Mexico export significant amounts of 
oil to the Allies. The lack of exports led to a shortage of capital, thereby reducing 
access to skills and technologies used to exploit and discover oil. By comparison, at 
the end of World War II, Venezuela received seven percent more per barrel from 
foreign oil investors than Mexico received from Pemex.300 Venezuelan production 
was also six times that of Mexico.301 
What are the long-term lessons of the 1917 and 1938 events in Mexico? 
Through protracted struggle, foreign oil investors and oil-importing nations realized 
the trend towards sovereign control over oil resources. The United Nations 
Resolution No. 1803,302 adopted in 1963 and backed by the U.S., was an expression 
of a state’s right to assert sovereignty over its petroleum resources, including the 
right to expropriate natural resources in the national interest upon payment of 
appropriate compensation. Conversely, oil-producing governments came to 
understand that oil was a commodity that may be best managed by private investors 
and regulated and taxed by government. In Mexico’s case, outright expropriation of 
foreign investments in oil also proved to be an ineffective bargaining tool. With these 
lessons in mind, most governments sought to renegotiate concessions, secure profit 
sharing and participation with oil investors through government-owned national oil 
companies, and increase their take through the imposition of additional taxes. 
§ 20.08 MEXICO OIL POST WORLD WAR II 
The 1938 Mexican expropriation was a major turning point for Mexican oil, 
though it did not immediately halt foreign investment in Mexican oil. Until the 
prohibition of concessions in 1940, the Mexican government did grant some 
concessions to foreign oil companies, followed by what might today be called risk-
service contracts.303 However, foreign investment interest in Mexico declined due to 
oil companies’ dissatisfaction with the risk-service contracts and fiscal terms offered 
by the Mexican government compared to drilling opportunities elsewhere. 
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In 1958, leftist President Adolfo López Mateos ceased offering any 
contracts to petroleum investors, initiating a complete ban on foreign investment.304 
The ban was in apparent retaliation to Pemex Director General’s refusal to provide 
copies of contracts made by Pemex with foreign companies during his tenure from 
1946 to 1958.305 In 1960, existing concessions were terminated by further 
constitutional amendments.306 After 1958, future oil contracts with foreign 
enterprises were limited to the payment of fixed sums of money for the performance 
of specified technical services rendered by oil companies on behalf of Pemex.307 
Because oil companies were not interested in performing services for money, Pemex 
was forced to employ expensive service companies. In 1973,308 in response to the 
failure of foreign service contracts, President Luis Echeverría Álvarez erected the 
so-called “Echeverrían Wall”—laws greatly restricting all foreign investment in 
Mexico.309 By the time of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Mexico furnished only 1% of 
U.S. oil imports.310 
Aside from exploiting the Poza Rica field discovered by El Aguila in 1930, 
Pemex had done little to develop new reserves.311 In 1972, however—at an opportune 
time when the Mexican economy was near collapse—Pemex discovered the Reforma 
Field.312 Mexico was once again a net exporter by 1974. After a fisherman 
complained of an oil sheen in the Bay of Campeche, which turned out to be from 
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natural seeps of oil in the bay, Pemex discovered the enormous Cantarell field in 
1976.313 
 
The capacity for monetary digestion is like that of a human body. 
You can’t eat more than you can digest or you become ill. It’s the 
same way for the economy. 
 
-José López Portillo, President of Mexico, 1976–1982 
 
Thus, Mexico—like many oil countries—enjoyed a new oil boom in the 
mid-1970s and early 1980s. The oil boom was not without its costs, however, as 
production from Reforma, Cantarell, and other fields led the government to become 
overly dependent on oil revenues, while depriving Pemex of capital necessary to find 
replacement reserves. Under the assumption that oil revenues would enrich Mexico, 
the Mexican government borrowed money.314 When oil prices collapsed in the mid-
1980s, the debt led to an economic crisis that nearly caused the collapse of the 
Mexican economy and their lenders, including several major American banks.315 
 
We thought we were rich. We had oil. 
 
-Jesús Silva Herzog, Minister of Finance 
 
Mexico avoided collapse through the efforts of Finance Minister Jesús Silva 
Herzog, the son of the man who chaired the Mexican review commission in 1937.316 
Herzog made several secret trips to the U.S. in 1982 to meet with Chairmen of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, the Treasury Secretary, Donald Regan, and 
several bank creditors.317 Together they negotiated a financial bailout package—
creatively termed “rollover” refinancing—which was really a euphemism for partial 
default.318 The bailout proved to be much needed, as the peso became significantly 
devalued, and the Mexican economy remained stagnant throughout much of the 
1980s. 
Despite the woes of the Mexican economy, the Echeverrían Wall continued 
to restrict foreign investment. However, the government of President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari began to gradually relax the foreign investment law in 1989.319 The 
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changes permitted limited investment in the natural gas and petrochemical industries 
via Mexican trusts that held legal title in Mexican banks for the benefit of foreign-
investor beneficiaries.320 To facilitate this program, Salinas divided Pemex into four 
subsidiaries: Pemex-Exploration and Production, Pemex-Refining, Pemex-Gas, and 
Pemex-Petrochemicals.321 Salinas also attempted to reign in the power and influence 
of labor unions, particularly the Union of Oil Workers of the Mexican Republic.322 
His greatest achievement came in 1994 with NAFTA, which substantially improved 
the Mexican economy.323 The following year, when Salinas was forced into exile due 
to a corruption scandal, new President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León permitted 
limited direct foreign investment in some activities involving natural gas and 
petrochemicals.324 
Nevertheless, foreign investment remained limited in the upstream oil 
sector, consistent with the NAFTA exception protecting Mexican oil resources from 
the operative provisions of NAFTA.325 After NAFTA, in the 1990s, privatization and 
further relaxation of foreign investment in the petroleum sector occurred, but not in 
the upstream sector.326 Therefore, after more than a century of strife between the 
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Mexican government and oil companies, the 2013 Reform represents a compelling 
new arrangement, which may balance the benefits of retaining sovereign control over 
Mexican oil resources with the advantages of foreign technology and investment. 
§ 20. 09 CONCLUSION  
Because of President Díaz’s 1884 mining law, Mexico’s twentieth century 
began with U.S.-type private exploitation of oil by largely foreign oil investors who 
regarded the oil as privately owned, real property. However, the Mexican people 
never embraced the notion of private mineral ownership, as private mineral 
ownership ran counter to traditional Spanish and Mexican legal concepts. Although 
private ownership was not a major reason for the Mexican Revolution, the oil boom 
that occurred in Mexico’s Golden Lane occurred simultaneously with a violent 
revolution that ultimately led to the nationalization of minerals under the provisions 
of the revolutionary 1917 constitution. Due to the stubbornness and arrogance of oil 
investors, backed by the U.S. and British governments, a twenty-year struggle 
ensued between a series of conciliatory Mexican governments more concerned about 
retaining power than about ideology and oil investors over the resolution of their pre-
existing oil claims. In 1938, a stronger President Lázaro Cardenas nationalized the 
oil industry, with further constitutional reform and subsequent legislation that led to 
the expropriation of oilfields and creation of Pemex. After World War II, ensuing 
nationalist governments reduced foreign investment and further tightened the 
restrictions on private investment and services in the oil sector. Even NAFTA—
which entered into force in 1994 and led to a huge increase in foreign investment 
generally—contained an exception that continued to restrict foreign investment in 
Mexico’s oil sector.327 By the mid-1990s, however, limited investment was allowed 
in natural gas and in petrochemicals. This small opening gradually evolved into the 
revolutionary 2013 reforms—the focus of Part II of this article.328 
Readers who think that the history of foreign investment in Mexico’s 
petroleum industry is old news to be ignored should remember that Expropriation 
Day, March 18, continues to be celebrated as a national holiday. Public opinion polls 
show that the 2013 reforms are becoming less—not more—popular.329 While a 
reversal of the reforms (discussed in Part II) is unlikely, investors must continue to 
be mindful of Mexico’s tortured oil history as they embark on what we hope will be 
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a “win-win” era of oil exploration and development for foreign investors and the 
Mexican people. 
